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   Illicit	   trafficking	   represents	   a	   significant	   threat	   to	   U.S.	   national	   security	  
and	  the	  nation’s	  strategic	  interests.	  	  It	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  no	  single	  solution	  
or	   source,	   yet	   has	   numerous	   disparate	   effects	   on	   the	   United	   States	   and	   our	  
partner	  nations.	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  will	  focus	  attention	  on	  narco-­‐
trafficking	   and	   its	   attendant	   affects.	   	   The	   flow	   of	   narcotics	   is	   the	   primary	  
trafficking	   threat	   into	   the	  United	   States	   and	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   all	  
other	  illicit	  trafficking.	  	  Traditionally,	  illicit	  trafficking	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  zones	  
for	   ease	  of	  understanding	   the	   lifecycle	  of	   illicit	   trafficking	   from	   source	   to	   end	  
user.	   	   These	   zones	   are:	   the	   source	   zone	   (where	   the	   narcotics	   and	   other	   illicit	  
goods	   are	   grown,	   manufactured,	   and	   produced),	   the	   transit	   zone	   (the	   paths	  
upon	  which	  illicit	  goods	  move	  to	  the	  end	  user),	  and	  the	  arrival	  zone	  (where	  the	  
illicit	  goods	  are	  distributed	  and	  consumed	  by	  the	  end	  user).	  	  
	   U.	   S.	   Southern	   Command	   (SOUTHCOM),	   as	   the	   Geographic	   Combatant	  
Command	   assigned	   the	   area	   of	   responsibility	   (AOR)	   which	   includes	   the	  
Caribbean,	  Central	  America	  and	  South	  America,	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  fight	  
against	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	   the	   source	   and	   transit	   zones.	   	   SOUTHCOM	   is	  
assigned	  three	  essential	  missions	  in	  this	  fight:	  1)	  Aerial	  and	  maritime	  detection	  
and	   monitoring	   of	   narco-­‐trafficking	   and	   other	   illicit	   trafficking	   into	   the	   U.S.	  
southern	   approaches	   (transit	   zone);	   2)	   Support	   to	   U.S.	   and	   foreign	   law	  
enforcement	   in	   the	   interdiction	  of	   traffickers	  and	   their	   contraband	  within	   the	  
AOR	  (source	  and	  transit	  zones);	  and	  3)	  Building	  capacity	  of	  partner	  nations	   in	  
the	  AOR	  to	  enhance	  their	  security,	  stability,	  and	  anti-­‐trafficking	  efforts	  (source	  
and	  transit	  zones).	  	  	  
                                                
∗	  The	  views	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  those	  of	  the	  authors	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  the	  
views	  of	  DOD	  or	  its	  Components.	  
∗	   LCDR	   Gavin	   currently	   serves	   as	   an	   Operational	   Law	   and	   Maritime	   Law	   attorney,	   U.S.	  
SOUTHCOM.	  	  CPT	  Corbin	  serves	  as	  the	  Assistant	  Administrative	  Law	  and	  Detention	  Operations	  
Law	  attorney,	  U.S.	  SOUTHCOM.	  Col	  Lecce	  is	  the	  Staff	  Judge	  Advocate,	  U.S.	  SOUTHCOM.	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   SOUTHCOM	  and	  the	  nation	  at	  large	  face	  many	  ongoing	  challenges,	  which	  
impede	  counter	  narcotics	  operations.	   	  Traffickers	  possess	  many	  advantages	  to	  
include	   agility,	   vast	   financial	   resources,	   complex	   networks,	   ruthless	   methods	  
and	   tactics,	   and	   strong	  end	  user	  demand.	   	   These	  advantages,	   combined	  with	  
the	   decreasing	   availability	   of	   U.S.	   resources	   to	   combat	   them,	   create	   an	  
environment,	  which	  requires	  greater	  coordination	  and	  commitment	  within	  the	  
U.S.	  and	  our	  partner	  nations.	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I. 	  	  PROBLEM	  STATEMENT	  
	   There	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   large	   demand	   for	   illicit	   goods,	   particularly	  
narcotics,	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   	  An	  estimated	  40	  million	  Americans	   consume	  
illicit	  drugs	  for	  non-­‐medical	  purposes	  or	  misuse	  prescription	  medications,	  with	  
roughly	  half	  of	  them	  using	  marijuana	  only.1	  	  The	  Latin	  American	  drug	  trade	  also	  
extends	  to	  Europe	  and	  Africa.2	  	  Europe	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  cocaine	  consumer	  
after	   North	   America.3	   	   This	   amounts	   to	   massive	   proceeds	   for	   transnational	  
organized	  criminal	  (TOC)	  enterprises,	  with	  some	  estimates	  reaching	  as	  much	  as	  
$84	  billion	  a	  year	  from	  cocaine	  alone4,	  and	  between	  $750	  billion	  and	  $1	  trillion	  
                                                
1	  CLARE	  RIBANDO	  SEELKE,	  JUNE	  S.	  BEITTEL,	  LIANA	  SUN	  WYLER	  AND	  MARK	  P.	  SULLIVAN,	  CONG.	  RESEARCH	  SERV.,	  
R41215,	  LATIN	  AMERICA	  AND	  THE	  CARIBBEAN:	  ILLICIT	  DRUG	  TRAFFICKING	  AND	  U.S.	  COUNTERDRUG	  PROGRAMS	  
1	  (2011)	  available	  at	  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf.	  
2	  See	  LIANA	  SUN	  WYLER	  AND	  NICOLAS	  COOK,	  CONG.	  RESEARCH	  SERV.,	  R40838,	  ILLEGAL	  DRUG	  TRADE	  IN	  
AFRICA:	  TRENDS	  AND	  U.S.	  POLICY	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40838.pdf,	  
Seelke,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  1.	  	  
3	  See	  United	  Nations	  Office	  of	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (UNODC),	  World	  Drug	  Report	  2010,	  UNITED	  
NATIONS,	  2010,	  Seelke	  supra	  note	  1.	  	  
4	  UNODC,	  Estimating	  illicit	  financial	  flows	  resulting	  from	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  other	  
transnational	  organized	  crime,	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  2011.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  Symposium	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a	  year	  from	  all	  revenue	  sources.5	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  illicit	  drug	  flow	  originates	  
and	  moves	  through	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  to	  North	  America,	  Europe,	  and	  
Africa.6	  
	   There	  are	   several	   reasons	  why	  Central	   and	  South	  America	   serve	  as	   the	  
primary	   source	   and	   transit	   zones	   for	   the	   global	   cocaine	   market.	   	   First,	   the	  
region	  is	  fertile	  ground	  for	  cultivating	  source	  plants.	   	  Virtually	  all	  cocaine	  that	  
enters	   the	   global	   market	   originates	   in	   South	   America,	   specifically	   Colombia,	  
Peru	  and	  Bolivia.7	  	  The	  coca	  bush,	  which	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Andean	  region	  of	  South	  
America,	   is	   the	   raw	  material	   used	   to	  make	   cocaine.	   	   Opium	  poppy,	  which	   is	  
used	   to	   produce	   opiates,	   is	   also	   found	   Colombia,	   as	   well	   as	   Mexico	   and	  
Guatemala.	   	   Marijuana	   is	   cultivated	   in	   virtually	   all	   nations	   in	   the	   region.	  	  
Second,	   Central	   and	   South	   America’s	   close	   geographic	   proximity	   to	   the	   U.S.	  
facilitates	   the	   relatively	   easy	   transportation	   of	   illicit	   goods.	   	   Third,	   economic	  
and	  social	  conditions	   in	  these	  regions	  create	  vulnerabilities	  and	  opportunities	  
for	   TOC	   enterprises	   to	   exploit,	   while	   creating	   difficulties	   for	   partner	   nation	  
government	  intervention.	  	  	  
	   The	  adversary	  in	  this	  fight	  is	  a	  formidable	  one.	  	  TOC	  enterprises	  achieve	  
success	  based	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  factors.	  	  Foremost	  is	  the	  massive	  profit	  they	  reap	  
from	   their	   illicit	   enterprises.	   	   With	   this	   cash	   flow,	   they	   are	   able	   to	   achieve	  
influence	   through	   political	   corruption,	   bribery,	   recruitment,	   information	  




                                                
5	  “Estimated	  Annual	  Costs	  and	  Resources	  Generated	  by	  TOC.”	  Information	  released	  by	  the	  
White	  House	  in	  support	  of	  the	  National	  Strategy	  to	  Combat	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime.	  
6	  “More	  recently	  there	  has	  been	  increased	  awareness	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  South	  American	  cocaine	  
through	  Venezuela	  to	  West	  Africa,	  particularly	  through	  Mali,	  Guinea	  Bissau,	  and	  other	  fragile	  
states,	  possibly	  benefitting	  not	  only	  the	  traditional	  regional	  TOC	  structures	  and	  their	  
Colombian	  and	  Mexican	  allies,	  but	  several	  terrorist	  entities	  including	  al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  the	  Islamic	  
Maghreb	  (AQIM),	  Hezbollah,6	  and	  the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Columbia	  (Fuerzas	  
Armadas	  Revolucionarias	  de	  Colombia	  [FARC]).”	  Douglas	  Farah,	  Transnational	  Organized	  
Crime,	  Terrorism,	  and	  Criminalized	  States	  in	  Latin	  America:	  An	  Emerging	  Tier-­‐One	  National	  
Security	  Priority,	  U.S.	  Army	  War	  College,	  Strategic	  Studies	  Institute,	  7	  (2012),	  available	  at	  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1117.pdf.	  
7	  Seelke	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  1;	  and	  UNODC,	  The	  Transatlantic	  Cocaine	  Market,	  United	  Nations,	  
April	  2011.	  
8	  The	  White	  House	  estimates	  in	  its	  2011	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  Strategy	  that	  money	  
laundering	  accounts	  for	  $1.3	  trillion	  to	  $3.3	  trillion—or	  between	  2	  percent	  and	  5	  percent	  of	  the	  
world’s	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP).	  Bribery	  from	  TOCs	  adds	  close	  to	  $1	  trillion	  to	  that	  
amount,	  while	  drug	  trafficking	  generates	  an	  estimated	  $750	  billion	  to	  $1	  trillion,	  counterfeited	  
and	  pirated	  goods	  adds	  another	  $500	  billion,	  and	  illicit	  firearms	  sales	  generate	  from	  $170	  bil-­‐
lion	  to	  $320	  billion.	  Farah,	  supra	  note	  6	  at	  2-­‐3.	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II. 	  	  SOURCE	  AND	  TRANSIT	  ZONES	  
	   As	  outlined	  above,	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  are	   the	  primary	  source	  and	  
transit	   zones	   for	   illicit	   trafficking,	   and	   particularly	   drug	   trafficking,	   into	   the	  
United	  States.	   	  Given	  that	  the	  entire	  world’s	  cocaine	  supply	  comes	  from	  three	  
countries	  along	  the	  Andean	  Ridge,	  (Colombia,	  Bolivia,	  and	  Peru)	  identifying	  that	  
area	  as	  a	  cocaine	  “source”	  zone	  is	  certainly	  apt.	  	  With	  an	  estimated	  $84	  billion	  
in	  annual	  global	  sales,9	  cocaine	  remains	  the	  most	  profitable	  activity	  for	  criminal	  
networks	   operating	   in	   the	   region.	   	   However,	   as	   we	   will	   discuss	   later,	   TOC	  
enterprises	  rarely	  traffic	   in	  only	  one	  commodity.	   	  The	  networks	  established	  to	  
move	  narcotics	  also	  move	  other	  illicit	  goods	  such	  as	  guns,	  precursor	  chemicals,	  
counterfeit	   pharmaceuticals,	   and	   persons.	   	   Transnational	   criminal	   networks	  
have	   a	   ripple	   effect	   on	   society	   at	   large,	  making	   an	   area	   susceptible	   to	   other	  
illicit	   activity.	   	   Based	   on	   this	   vulnerability,	   TOC	   networks	   create	   and	   identify	  
ways	  to	  exploit	  efficiencies	  and	  maximize	  profits.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
                                                
9	  UNODC,	  Estimating	  illicit	  financial	  flows	  resulting	  from	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  other	  
transnational	  organized	  crime,	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  2011.	  





For	   example,	   approximately	   95%	  of	   cocaine	   entering	   the	  U.S.	   travels	   through	  
Central	  America.10	   	   TOC	  networks	  also	  use	   these	   same	  pathways	   to	   transport	  
large	  amounts	  of	  opiates,	  marijuana	  and	  methamphetamine.	  
	   TOC	  organizations	  use	   this	  primary	   transit	  path	   in	   all	   physical	  domains:	  
air,	   sea,	   and	   land.	   	   A	   brief	   review	   of	   the	   previous	   graphic	   reveals	   the	  
geographic	  diversity	  and	  opportunities	  available	   to	  a	  TOC	  enterprise.	   	  From	  a	  
maritime	   perspective,	   an	   area	   of	   ocean	   larger	   than	   the	   continental	   U.S.	   is	  
available	  for	  traffickers	  to	  utilize.	   	  Outside	  of	  hurricane	  season,	  the	  Caribbean	  
Basin,	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico	  and	  Straits	  of	  Florida	  are	  generally	  calm	  bodies	  of	  water	  
upon	  which	  a	  small	  vessel	  can	  safely	  transit	  significant	  distances.	  	  Additionally,	  
there	  are	  various	  waypoints	  along	  any	  given	  path	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  re-­‐fueling	  
points,	   safe	   havens	   and	   logistical	   hubs	   for	   a	   transit.	   	   Nearly	   all	   of	   these	  
waypoints	   are	   located	  within	   the	   sovereign	   territory	   of	   other	   nations,	  which	  
have	  varying	  degrees	  of	  resources	  and	  capabilities.	  	  From	  an	  aerial	  perspective,	  
much	  of	  the	  same	  is	  true.	  	  Almost	  80%	  of	  drug	  flights	  from	  South	  America	  land	  
in	  Honduras.11	  	  	  
                                                
10	  OFFICE	  OF	  NAT’L	  DRUG	  CONTROL	  POLICY,	  ONDCP-­‐01-­‐11,	  COCAINE	  SMUGGLING	  IN	  2010	  2	  (2012),	  
available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/international-­‐partnerships-­‐
content/20_january_cocaine_smuggling_in_2010_for_posting_on_ondcp_webpage_2.pdf.	  
11	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  State,	  Internat’l	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report:	  Drug	  and	  Chemical	  Control,	  
VOL.	  1	  BUREAU	  OF	  INTERNAT’L	  NARCOTICS	  AND	  LAW	  ENFORCEMENT	  AFFAIRS,	  251	  (2012),	  available	  at	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   As	  cooperation	  with	  the	  government	  of	  Venezuela	  has	  diminished	  since	  
the	  mid-­‐2000s,	   that	   nation	  has	  become	  a	  major	   transit	   point	   for	   drug	   flights	  
ultimately	  destined	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe.12	  	  In	  the	  Caribbean,	  both	  Jamaica	  
and	   the	   Bahamas	   are	   major	   transit	   countries	   for	   the	   flow	   of	   illicit	   goods,	  
particularly	   cocaine.	   	   Once	   ashore	   in	   Central	   America,	   there	   is	   almost	   no	  
stopping	   the	  majority	   of	   this	   cocaine	   before	   it	   enters	   the	   United	   States	   and	  
lands	  on	  street	  corners	  across	  America.	   	  Cocaine	  places	  a	  significant	  strain	  on	  
our	   nation’s	   health	   care	   and	   criminal	   justice	   systems	   and	   costs	   American	  
taxpayers	   an	   estimated	   $193	  billion	   per	   year.13,14	   	   	   The	  most	   critical	   point	   of	  
this	   geographic	   analysis	   is	   that	   the	   full	   southern	   flank	   of	   the	   United	   States	  
presents	   a	   very	   broad	   area	   of	   access,	   and	   is	   in	   close	   proximity	   to	   the	   global	  
cocaine	  source	  zone	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  potential	  waypoints.	  	  	  
	   Beyond	   geography,	   TOC	   networks	   benefit	   from	   the	   socio-­‐economic	  
conditions	  often	   found	   in	  areas	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	   	  Poverty	  
and	   lack	   of	   economic	   opportunity	   are	   critical	   issues	   that	   underlie	   the	  
permissive	   conditions	   that	   facilitate	   illicit	   trafficking.	   	   These	   issues,	   coupled	  
with	  a	  lack	  of	  governmental	  resources	  available	  to	  bolster	  social	  and	  economic	  
institutions	   or	   to	   combat	   criminal	   activity	   combine	   to	   form	   critical	   enabling	  
factors	   for	   these	   networks.	   	   Underfunded	   security	   forces	   and	   insufficient	  
institutional	   reform	   efforts	   expose	   law	   enforcement	   and	   judicial	   sectors	   to	  
corruption.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  those	  law	  enforcement	  and	  judicial	  entities	  are	  
vulnerable	  to	  threats	  of	  violence	  or	  even	  death.	  	  In	  addition,	  a	  lack	  of	  funding	  
and	  resources	  in	  these	  sectors	  leads	  to	  insufficient	  manpower	  and	  political	  will	  
to	   combat	   these	   problems.	   	   The	   confluence	   of	   these	   factors	   is	   incredibly	  
entrenched,	   allowing	   criminal	   networks	   to	   operate	   with	   relative	   impunity.15	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  2012,	  The	  United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  reported	  
that	   convictions	   for	   serious	   criminal	   offenses	   in	   Central	   America	   and	   the	  
                                                                                                                             
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184314.pdf.	  
12	  Seelke	  ,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  2.	  
13	  Note:	  Upon	  landfall	  in	  Central	  America,	  bulk	  cocaine	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  multiple	  smaller	  
shipments	  for	  transit	  into	  Mexico	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  making	  large	  interdictions	  extremely	  
difficult.	  
14	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  The	  Economic	  Impact	  of	  Illicit	  Drug	  Use	  on	  American	  Society,	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  
OF	  JUSTICE	  NAT’L	  DRUG	  INTELLIGENCE	  CENTER,	  PRODUCT	  NO.	  2011-­‐Q0317-­‐002,	  at	  ix	  (2011).	  	  	  
	  
15	  “Though	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  state	  government	  (as	  opposed	  to	  its	  absence)	  is	  ordinarily	  
considered	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  situation,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  state	  is	  beneficial	  or	  positive	  only	  if	  it	  
meets	  the	  needs	  of	  its	  people.	  If	  the	  state,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  many	  
other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  is	  present	  but	  is	  viewed,	  with	  good	  reason,	  as	  corrupt,	  incompetent,	  
and/or	  predatory,	  then	  its	  presence	  is	  not	  beneficial	  in	  terms	  of	  creating	  state	  strength	  or	  state	  
capacity.	  In	  fact,	  where	  the	  state	  is	  strongest	  but	  least	  accountable	  for	  abuses,	  people	  often	  
prefer	  nonstate	  actors	  to	  exercise	  authority.”	  Farah	  at	  18	  citing	  ROBERT	  H.	  JACKSON,	  QUASI-­‐STATES:	  
SOVEREIGNTY,	  INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  AND	  THE	  THIRD	  WORLD	  (1990).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	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Caribbean	  have	  ranged	  from	  as	  low	  as	  2%	  to	  42%.16	  	  	  
III. 	  	  VULNERABILITIES	  CREATED	  AND	  EXPLOITED	  BY	  TOC	  ENTERPRISES	  	  	  
	   Transnational	   criminal	   organizations	   threaten	   citizen	   security,	  
undermine	   basic	   human	   rights,	   “erode	   good	   governance,	   cripple	   rule	   of	   law	  
through	   corruption,	   [and]	   hinder	   economic	   competitiveness.”17	   	   Generally	  
traffickers	   and	   TOC	   enterprises	   do	   not	   seek	   to	   directly	   harm	   the	  U.S.	   or	   our	  
allies.	  	  On	  this	  point	  they	  are	  indifferent.	  	  They	  simply	  seek	  profit	  and	  control	  of	  
the	   criminal	   enterprise.	   	   Their	   actions	   are	   intended	   to	   ensure	   continuous	  
operation	   free	   from	  government	   interference	  to	  minimize	  time	  and	  expenses	  
and	  maximize	  profit.	   	  These	  enterprises	  create	  sophisticated	  networks,	  which	  
sustain	  their	  business	  interests	  and	  evolve	  using	  technology	  and	  innovation	  to	  
evade	  governmental	  interference.	  
	   As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  methods	  used	  by	  TOC	  enterprises	  to	  traffic	  cocaine	  
and	   other	   drugs	   are	   simply	   demonstrative	   of	   the	   greater	   problem	   of	   illicit	  
trafficking.	   	   To	   achieve	   continued	   success	   in	   their	   business,	   TOC	   enterprises	  
establish	   complex	   supply	   chains	   with	   broad	   capabilities.	   	   They	   create	  
sophisticated	  and	  highly	  capable	  organizational	  structures.	  	  Much	  like	  any	  large	  
commercial	  enterprise,	  TOC	  networks	  have	  logistical	  demands,	  communication	  
needs,	   financial	   distribution	   requirements,	   and	   equipment	   procurement	   and	  
maintenance	   concerns.	   	   They	   are	   continually	   evolving	   and	   refining	   their	  
techniques	  to	  ensure	  success.	  	  Unlike	  legitimate	  business	  enterprises,	  however,	  
TOC	   networks	   are	   not	   encumbered	   by	   governmental	   regulations	   or	   rules,	  
taxes,	  or	  even	  social	  demands	  and	  expectations.	  	  	  
	   The	   application	   of	  widespread	   and	   often	   indiscriminate	   violence	   is	   one	  
method	  by	  which	  these	  organizations	  impose	  their	  will.	  	  The	  rates	  of	  homicide	  
in	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   Caribbean	   are	   sharply	   on	   the	   rise,	   adding	   to	   the	  
already	  extremely	  high	  rates	  prevalent	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Compared	  to	  
other	  regions,	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  have	  the	  greatest	  percentage	  
of	  homicides	  both	  with	  firearms	  and	  attributed	  to	  organized	  crime	  and	  gangs.18	  	  
Multiple	  studies	  suggest	  that	  trafficking	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  major	  factor	   in	  this	  
                                                
16	  See	  United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime	  (UNODC),	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  in	  
Central	  Am.	  and	  the	  Caribbean,	  A	  Threat	  Assessment,	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  Sept.	  2012,	  at	  76,	  Mark	  
Ungar,	  Democracy,	  Law,	  and	  Order,	  LATIN	  AM.	  RESEARCH	  REVIEW,	  VOL.	  44,	  No.	  3	  (2009),	  available	  at	  
https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/latin_american_research_r
eview/v044/44.3.ungar.pdf.	  
17	  James	  R.	  Clapper,	  Dir.	  of	  Nat’l	  Intelligence,	  Statement	  for	  the	  Record:	  Worldwide	  Threat	  
Assessment	  of	  the	  US	  Intelligence	  Community	  before	  the	  Senate	  Select	  Comm.	  on	  Intelligence,	  
at	  5	  (March	  12,	  2013).	  
18	  UNODC,	  Homicide	  Statistics,	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  Feb.	  2010,	  at	  20,	  39-­‐40.	  







	   Influence	  and	  corruption	  are	  other	  techniques	  successfully	   leveraged	  by	  
these	  networks.	   	   TOC	  organizations	  use	   violence	  or	   the	   threat	  of	   violence	   as	  
well	   as	   bribery	   to	   coerce,	   corrupt	   and	   control	   law	   enforcement	   and	   judicial	  
sectors.	  	  These	  techniques	  create	  a	  permissive	  environment	  for	  trafficking.	  	  In	  
police	   forces	   for	   example,	   as	   corruption	   and	   coercion	   increases,	   security,	  
arrests	   and	   overall	   law	   enforcement	   decreases.	   	   This	   in	   turn	   creates	  
vulnerabilities	   and	   opportunities	   that	   are	   often	   exploited	   by	   traffickers.	   	   If	  
police	   are	  unwilling	   to	   investigate,	   arrest	   and	   testify	   against	   a	  drug	   trafficker	  
because	   they	   have	   been	   co-­‐opted,	   then	   the	   conditions	   are	   set	   for	   illicit	  
trafficking	  and	  violence	  to	  thrive.	  	  The	  same	  is	  true	  when	  a	  judge	  is	  unwilling	  to	  
hear	  a	  case	  or	  adjudge	  a	  conviction	  because	  of	  a	  bribe	  or	  a	  threat	  against	  her	  
or	   a	   family	   member.	   	   When	   law	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   fail,	   it	   becomes	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  prevent	  further	  crime	  and	  violence.	  	  
	   While	   the	   United	   States	   uses	   tools	   such	   as	   the	   witness	   protection	  
program	   to	   enhance	   judicial	   system	   security,	   these	  measures	   are	   very	   costly	  
and	   rely	   on	   the	   large	   geographic	   area	   of	   our	   nation	   to	   be	   effective.	   	   These	  
considerations	   present	   challenges	   to	   many	   Latin	   American	   and	   Caribbean	  
nations.	  
	   Ineffective	   border	   security	   is	   another	   factor	   that	   facilitates	   illicit	  
networks.	  	  Due	  largely	  to	  economic	  limitations,	  there	  is	  an	  inability	  to	  properly	  
monitor	  and	  control	  borders.	  	  Other	  aggravating	  factors	  such	  as	  long	  borders,	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20	  
extended	  coastlines,	  numerous	  littoral	  islands	  and	  the	  tropical	  topography	  only	  
serve	  to	   further	  complicate	   the	  struggle.	   	  Some	  countries,	   such	  as	  Nicaragua,	  
have	   passed	   laws	   that	   limit	   who	   may	   legally	   own	   property	   within	   a	   certain	  
distance	  from	  their	  national	  border.	   	  This	  serves	  to	   limit	  the	  control	  a	  private	  
actor	  may	  have	  over	  critical	  geographic	  areas	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  trafficking.	  	  To	  
maximize	   available	   resources,	   many	   nations	   combine	   border	   security	  
responsibilities	   among	   different	   governmental	   entities.	   	   This	   often	   includes	  
enhancing	  police	  and	  military	  border	  protection	  authorities.	  	  However,	  without	  
adequate	   resources	   in	   terms	   of	   manpower,	   technology,	   and	   equipment,	   a	  
nation	  can	  only	  exert	  limited	  effective	  control	  over	  its	  borders.	  	  	  
	   Acting	  across	  loosely	  controlled	  borders	  and	  within	  multiple	  jurisdictions	  
is	   a	   significant	  advantage	   for	  TOC	  networks.	   	   It	   is	  well	  documented	   that	  TOC	  
operations	   seek	   to	   operate	   in	   ungoverned	   or	   under-­‐governed	   space.20	  	  
Countering	  this	  advantage	  requires	  sovereigns	  to	  rapidly	  share	  information	  and	  
coordinate	   activity.	   	   Further,	   it	   requires	   consideration	   of	   regulation	   and	  
enforcement	   capabilities	   outside	   of	   one’s	   own	   sovereign	   territory.	   	   Criminal	  
networks	   exploit	   these	   gaps	   in	   enforcement	   and	   regulation.	   	   For	   example,	  
traffickers	   who	   use	   Central	   America	   (CENTAM)	   as	   a	   waypoint	   for	   the	   air	  
transport	   of	   their	   illicit	   goods,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   are	   taking	   advantage	   of	  
CENTAM’s	  inability	  to	  consistently	  prevent	  or	  hamper	  this	  type	  of	  activity.	  
	   The	  TOC-­‐established	  network	  can	  also	  be	  utilized	  to	  facilitate	  other	  and	  
potentially	  more	   dangerous	   threats	   such	   as	   terrorists	   and	  Weapons	   of	  Mass	  
Destruction	  (WMD).	  	  Terrorists	  already	  exploit	  weaknesses	  created	  by	  the	  drug	  
trade.	   	   In	   Peru,	   the	   Sendero	   Luminoso	   (Shining	   Path)	   has	   been	   involved	   in	  
terrorist	  activities	  since	  the	  1960s.	  	  Previously	  believed	  dormant,	  it	  has	  recently	  
renewed	  small-­‐scale	  attacks	  on	  the	  Peruvian	  police	  and	  military.	  	  Shining	  Path	  
funds	   its	   agenda	   through	   taxing	   the	   coca	   growers	   in	   its	   area	   of	   operation	   in	  
exchange	  for	  providing	  protection	  from	  other	  drug	  trafficking	  organizations.21	  	  
The	   Fuerzas	   Armadas	   Revolucionarias	   de	   Colombia	   (FARC),	   in	   English,	   the	  
                                                
20	  “Control	  of	  broad	  swaths	  of	  land	  by	  these	  nonstate	  groups	  in	  Latin	  America	  not	  only	  
facilitates	  the	  movement	  of	  illegal	  products,	  both	  northward	  and	  southward,	  through	  
transcontinental	  pipelines,	  but	  also	  undermines	  the	  stability	  of	  an	  entire	  region	  of	  great	  
strategic	  interest	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  traditional	  threat	  is	  broadly	  understood	  to	  be	  posed	  
by	  the	  illicit	  movement	  of	  contraband	  (drugs,	  money,	  weapons,	  and	  stolen	  cars),	  people	  
(human	  traffic,	  gang	  members,	  and	  drug	  cartel	  enforcers),	  and	  the	  billions	  of	  dollars	  these	  illicit	  
activities	  generate	  in	  an	  area	  where	  states	  have	  few	  resources	  and	  little	  legal	  or	  law	  
enforcement	  capacity.”	  Farah	  at	  19.	  
21	  See	  Kathryn	  Gregory,	  Backgrounder:	  Shining	  Path,	  Tupac	  Amaru,	  COUNCIL	  ON	  FOREIGN	  
RELATIONS,	  August	  27,	  2009,	  available	  at	  http://www.cfr.org/peru/shining-­‐path-­‐tupac-­‐amaru-­‐
peru-­‐leftists/p9276,	  	  
Wiretaps	  Reveal	  Peru	  Coca	  Growers'	  Ties	  to	  Rebels,	  LATIN	  AM.	  HERALD	  TRIBUNE,	  Dec.	  1,	  2010,	  
available	  at	  http://www.laht.com/article.asp.	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21	  21	  
Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Colombia,	   finance	   their	   indigenous	   terrorist	  
activities	   in	   a	   similar	  manner.22	   	  Other	   international	   terrorist	   groups	   are	   also	  
believed	   to	   fund	   their	   terrorist	   activities	   through	   connections	   with	   TOC	  
enterprises	   in	   Latin	  America,	   particularly	   in	   the	   border	   areas	   between	  Brazil,	  
Argentina	   and	   Paraguay.23	   	   Evidence	   identified	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	  
Treasury	  in	  February	  of	  2011	  suggests	  that	  Lebanese	  Hezbollah	  was	  involved	  in	  
moving	  narcotics	   from	  South	  America	   into	  Europe	  and	   the	  Middle	  East.24	   	  As	  
retired	   Navy	   Admiral	   James	   G.	   Stavridis	   cautioned,	   the	   threat	   of	   enemy	  
convergence-­‐-­‐the	   combining	   of	   the	   network,	   financial	   resources	   and	  
infrastructure	  of	  a	  TOC	  enterprise	  with	  the	  ideals	  and	  objectives	  of	  a	  terrorist	  
group-­‐-­‐represents	   the	   greatest	   current	   potential	   threat	   to	   U.S.	   National	  
Security.25	  
IV. 	  	  UNITED	  STATES	  LEGAL	  RESPONSES	  TO	  TRANSNATIONAL	  ORGANIZED	  CRIME	  	  
	   Given	  this	  difficult	  situation,	  issues	  of	  jurisdiction,	  law,	  and	  enforcement	  
capability	   must	   be	   asked	   at	   every	   stage	   of	   the	   illicit	   trafficking	   cycle.	   	   For	  
example,	  if	  a	  drug	  is	  grown	  in	  Colombia,	  travels	  through	  Panamanian	  territorial	  
seas	   to	   land	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Nicaragua	   where	   it	   is	   then	   transported	   into	  
Honduras,	   ultimately	   to	  make	   its	  way	   through	  Mexico	   into	   the	  U.S.	   –	  where	  
does	   the	   crime	   occur?	   	  Where	   is	   the	   best	   place	   to	   intervene?	  Who	   has	   the	  
jurisdiction	   to	   prosecute?	   	   Who	   is	   most	   affected?	   	   In	   the	   end,	   any	   delays,	  
miscommunications,	   or	   misinterpretations	   when	   answering	   these	   questions	  
serve	  to	  benefit	  the	  TOC	  network.	  
	   As	  a	  general	  rule,	  nations	  have	  criminal	  jurisdiction	  over	  acts	  committed	  
                                                
22	  “The	  FARC	  needs	  to	  move	  cocaine	  to	  U.S.	  and	  European	  markets	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  
money	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  its	  army	  of	  some	  9,000	  troops.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  the	  FARC,	  
with	  the	  help	  of	  traditional	  drug	  trafficking	  organizations,	  must	  move	  its	  product	  through	  
Central	  America	  and	  Mexico	  to	  the	  United	  States—the	  same	  route	  used	  by	  those	  who	  want	  to	  
move	  illegal	  aliens	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  those	  who	  want	  to	  move	  bulk	  cash	  shipments,	  
stolen	  cars,	  and	  weapons	  from	  the	  United	  States	  southward.	  All	  of	  this	  contraband	  traverses	  
the	  same	  territory,	  passes	  through	  the	  same	  gatekeepers,	  and	  is	  often	  interchangeable	  along	  
the	  way.	  A	  kilo	  of	  cocaine	  can	  be	  traded	  for	  roughly	  one	  ton	  of	  AK-­‐47	  assault	  rifles	  before	  
either	  of	  the	  contraband	  items	  reaches	  what	  would	  normally	  be	  its	  final	  destination.”	  Farah	  at	  
17.	  
23	  Anthony	  P.	  Placido,	  Assistant	  Adm’r	  for	  Intelligence,	  U.S.	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Admin.,	  Report	  
to	  House	  Oversight	  and	  Gov’t	  Reform	  Sub-­‐comm.	  on	  Nat’l	  Sec.	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  hearing	  on	  
Transnational	  Drug	  Enterprises	  (March	  3,	  2010).	  
24	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  “Treasury	  Identifies	  Lebanese	  Canadian	  Bank	  Sal	  as	  a	  Primary	  
Money	  Laundering	  Concern,”	  Press	  Release,	  February	  10,	  2011.	  
25	  See	  Thom	  Shanker,	  Globalization	  Creates	  a	  New	  Worry:	  Enemy	  Convergence,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  (May	  
30,	  2013,	  10:26	  AM),	  http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/globalization-­‐creates-­‐a-­‐
new-­‐worry-­‐enemy-­‐convergence.	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22	  
within	   their	   own	   sovereign	   territory,	   airspace,	   and	   seas.	   	   Extradition	  
agreements	  may	  be	  made	  with	  other	  nations	  to	  facilitate	  prosecution	  of	  cases.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries	  have	  extradition	  agreements	  with	  the	  
United	  States.26	  	  Beyond	  reliance	  on	  partner	  nation	  prosecution	  or	  extradition	  
of	   an	   individual	   in	   foreign	   custody,	   the	  Maritime	  Drug	   Law	   Enforcement	   Act	  
(MDLEA)27	  provides	  a	  vehicle	  for	  federal	  criminal	  prosecution	  against	  crimes	  in	  
the	  maritime	   domain.	   	   This	   Act	   prohibits	   the	  manufacture,	   distribution,	   and	  
possession	   with	   the	   intent	   to	   distribute	   controlled	   substances	   onboard	   any	  
vessel	   subject	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   or	   any	   vessel	   if	   the	  
individual	  is	  a	  citizen	  or	  resident	  alien	  of	  the	  United	  States.28	  	  Further,	  this	  act	  
explicitly	  applies	  outside	  the	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  United	  States.29	  	  The	  
broad	   scope	   of	   this	   act,	   specifically	   in	   the	   jurisdictional	   context,	   allows	   the	  
United	  States	  to	  prosecute	  crimes	  that	  occur	  in	  international	  waters,	  to	  include	  
crimes	  aboard	  vessels	  bearing	  the	  flag	  and	  registry	  of	  another	  nation,	  assuming	  
that	   coastal	   state	   consents	   to	   waive	   their	   own	   jurisdiction	   in	   favor	   of	   U.S.	  
jurisdiction.	  
	   However,	  there	  are	  cases	  that	  test	  the	  reach	  of	  criminal	  statutes	  such	  as	  
the	  MDLEA.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	  U.S.	   v.	   Bellaizac-­‐Hurtado,30	   the	   issue	   before	   the	  
court	   was	   whether	   a	   U.S.	   law	   could	   be	   enforced	   over	   a	   vessel	   conducting	  
activity	  in	  Panamanian	  territorial	  seas.31	  	  Despite	  the	  acquiescence	  of	  Panama,	  
the	   11th	   U.S.	   Circuit	   held	   that	   the	   U.S.	   could	   not	   impose	   jurisdiction	   for	   a	  
violation	   of	   the	  Maritime	   Drug	   Law	   Enforcement	   Act	   over	   a	   vessel	   acting	   in	  
another	  nation’s	  territorial	  seas.32	  	  The	  practical	  challenge	  is	  that	  the	  U.S.	  legal	  
system	  often	  offers	  the	  greatest	  chance	  of	  prosecutorial	  success	  compared	  to	  
the	  Central	  and	  South	  American	  nations	  who	  act	  as	  our	  partners	  in	  combatting	  
illicit	  trafficking.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  U.S.	  judicial	  system	  often	  
enables	  U.S.	  law	  enforcement	  to	  leverage	  traffickers	  for	  information	  about	  TOC	  
actors,	  procedures,	  and	   future	  crimes.	   	  Cases	  similar	   to	  Hurtado	  will	   likely	  be	  
tested	   in	   other	   judicial	   circuits	   seeking	   a	  more	   favorable	   result,	   which	   could	  
ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  issue	  making	  its	  way	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
                                                
26	  See	  Extradition,	  18	  U.S.C.	  Ch.	  209	  (2012).	  The	  list	  of	  Latin	  American	  and	  Caribbean	  countries	  
includes	  Antigua	  and	  Barbuda,	  Argentina,	  Barbados,	  Belize,	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  Colombia,	  Chile,	  
Costa	  Rica,	  Cuba,	  Dominica,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Ecuador,	  El	  Salvador,	  Guatemala,	  Guyana,	  
Haiti,	  Honduras,	  Jamaica,	  Nicaragua,	  Panama,	  Paraguay,	  Peru,	  Saint	  Lucia,	  Saint	  Vincent	  and	  
the	  Grenadines,	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  Uruguay,	  Venezuela.	  
27	  See	  Mfg.,	  Distrib.,	  or	  Possession	  of	  Controlled	  Substances	  on	  Vessels,	  46	  U.S.C.	  Ch.	  705	  
(2012).	  
28	  Id.	  	  
29	  46	  U.S.C.	  §	  70503(b)	  (2012).	  
30	  United	  States	  v.	  Bellaizac-­‐Hurtado,	  2012	  WL	  5395281	  (11th	  Cir.	  Nov.	  6,	  2012).	  
31	  Id.	  
32	  Id.	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V. RESPONSIBILITIES	  AND	  CHALLENGES	  FOR	  SOUTHCOM	  
	   SOUTHCOM’s	   geographic	   area	   of	   responsibility	   (AOR)	   begins	   at	   the	  
southern	  Mexico	  border	  and	  extends	  south	  to	  include	  all	  of	  Central	  and	  South	  
America,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Caribbean.	   	  Mexico,	  Puerto	  Rico	  and	  the	  Bahamas	  fall	  
into	   U.S.	   Northern	   Command’s	   (NORTHCOM)	   AOR.	   	   As	   the	   Geographic	  
Combatant	  Command	  responsible	  for	  all	  U.S.	  military	  personnel	  and	  activity	  in	  
the	   Caribbean	   and	   Central	   &	   South	   America,	   SOUTHCOM	   holds	   the	   primary	  
role	   within	   the	   Department	   of	   Defense	   (DoD)	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   illicit	  
trafficking.	  
	   First,	  SOUTHCOM	  executes	  DoD’s	  responsibility	  as	  the	  lead	  United	  States	  
Government	   agency	   in	   the	   detection	   and	  monitoring	   of	   aerial	   and	  maritime	  
drug	  trafficking	  into	  the	  United	  States.33	   	  Considering	  most	  drug	  traffic	  comes	  
into	   the	   U.S.	   through	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   Caribbean,	   SOUTHCOM	  
orchestrates	   a	   tremendous	   amount	   of	   resources	   and	   assets	   from	   across	  
multiple	   government	   agencies	   in	   a	   “whole	   of	   government”	   approach	   toward	  
combating	   this	   problem.	   	   Aircraft	   and	   vessels	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Coast	   Guard	  
(USCG),	  U.S.	  Navy	  (USN)	  and	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  (CBP)	  all	  provide	  
on	  scene	  awareness	  and	  presence	  in	  this	  mission.	  	  In	  addition,	  DoD-­‐contracted	  
aircraft	   and	   Partner	   Nation	   vessels	   and	   aircraft	   are	   regularly	   relied	   upon	   to	  
support	  this	  mission.	   	  Finally,	  multiple	  radar	  arrays	  capable	  of	  providing	  over-­‐
the-­‐horizon	   pictures	   are	   employed	   to	   round	   out	   SOUTHCOM	   detection	   and	  
monitoring	  assets.	  
	   With	  different	  U.S.	  agencies	  come	  different	  authorities.	   	  While	  DoD	  has	  
authority	  under	  U.S.	  Code	  Title	  10	  to	  conduct	  detection	  and	  monitoring,	  it	  has	  
no	  authority	  to	  enforce	  U.S.	  law.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Coast	  Guard	  is	  primarily	  responsible	  
for	   law	   enforcement	   within	   the	   maritime	   domain	   based	   on	   their	   statutory	  
authority	  under	  Title	  14	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Code.	  	  To	  succeed,	  SOUTHCOM’s	  detection	  
and	  monitoring	  mission	  must	  feed	  law	  enforcement	  action	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  For	  
example,	   DoD-­‐controlled	   assets	   provide	   actionable	   intelligence	   to	   law	  
enforcement	   or	   partner-­‐nation	   assets	   capable	   of	   affecting	   an	   interdiction.	  	  
Once	   the	   interdiction	   takes	   place,	   additional	   intelligence	   is	   collected	   by	   the	  
Drug	  Enforcement	  Agency	  (DEA)	  or	  other	  U.S.	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  is	  
fed	   back	   into	   the	   detection	   and	   monitoring	   cycle,	   informing	   the	   complex	  
coordination	  and	  placement	  of	  assets	  discussed	  earlier.	  
	   Further	   along	   in	   the	  process,	   the	  Department	   of	   Justice	   represents	   the	  
U.S.	   government	   in	   prosecuting	   traffickers.	   	   Successful	   prosecution	   leads	   to	  
                                                
33	  See	  Nat’l	  Def.	  Auth.	  Act	  for	  the	  Years	  1990	  and	  1991	  §	  1202,	  Pub.	  L.	  101-­‐189,	  Stat.	  1352	  
(1989),	  Detection	  and	  Monitoring	  of	  Aerial	  and	  Maritime	  Transit	  of	  Illegal	  Drugs:	  Dep’t	  of	  Def.	  
to	  be	  Lead	  Agency,	  10	  U.S.C.	  §124	  (2012).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  Symposium	  Ed.	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  IV	  
 
24	  
fewer	   TOC	   assets	   and	   increases	   the	   deterrence	   effect.	   	   Ultimately,	   the	  
patchwork	  of	  statutory	  authority	  granted	  to	  the	  various	  U.S.	  agencies	  involved	  
covering	   the	   source34,	   transit35	   and	   arrival36	   zones	   requires	   a	   whole	   of	  
government	  approach	  dependent	  on	  communication	  and	  teamwork.	  	  Without	  
these,	  effective	  enforcement	  and	  ultimate	  prosecution	  is	  not	  possible.	  
	   SOUTHCOM	   supports	   U.S.	   and	   foreign	   law	   enforcement	   in	   the	  
interdiction	  of	  traffickers	  and	  their	  contraband	  within	  the	  AOR.	  	  United	  States	  
military	   forces	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Coast	   Guard	   which	   operates	  
under	   the	   Department	   of	   Homeland	   Security)	   are	   largely	   prohibited	   from	  
enforcing	   state	  and	   federal	   law	  under	   the	  Posse	  Comitatus	  Act.37	   	  Unlike	   the	  
U.S.,	  many	  Caribbean,	  Central	  and	  South	  American	  nations’	  national	  militaries	  
have	   counter-­‐drug	   enforcement	   responsibilities.	   	   This	   is	   true	   for	   a	   variety	   of	  
reasons,	  but	   the	  two	  primary	  reasons	  are	  1)	   lack	  of	   resources	   to	  maintain	  an	  
adequately	   staffed,	   trained	   and	   funded	   law	   enforcement	   body(s);	   and	   2)	  
widespread	  police	  corruption	  and	  influence	  from	  TOC	  networks.	  	  	  
	   Given	   the	   complexity	   of	   TOC	   networks	   and	   its	   vast	   resources	   and	  
capabilities,	  the	  support	  SOUTHCOM	  can	  provide	  to	  law	  enforcement	  is	  critical.	  	  
Both	  Section	  1004	  of	  the	  1991	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  (NDAA),	  and	  
Chapter	  18	  of	  Title	  10	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Code	  establish	  the	  baseline	  from	  which	  DoD	  
can	  support	  both	  U.S.	  and	  partner	  nation	  law	  enforcement.38	  	  This	  support	  can	  
come	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   means,	   ranging	   from	   providing	   air	   transportation	   to	  
counter-­‐drug	  training.	  	  While	  the	  DoD	  may	  not	  have	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  take	  
direct	   action	   against	   TOC	  networks,	   the	  military	   has	   a	  myriad	  of	   resources	   it	  
may	  provide	  to	  assist.	  	  These	  resources	  come	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  to	  include:	  
tools	   and	   equipment,	   technology	   and	   software,	   manpower,	   training	   and	  
expertise,	  subject	  matter	  experts	  and	  planners,	  and	  intelligence	  lawfully	  gained	  
from	   the	   conduct	   of	   normal	   military	   operations.39	   	   Beyond	   physical	   and	  
                                                
34	  See	  Military	  Support	  for	  Civilian	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agencies,	  10	  U.S.C.	  Ch.	  18,	  §	  371-­‐82	  
(2012),	  Nat’l	  Def.	  Auth.	  Act	  §§	  1004,	  1021,	  1033	  (DoD	  as	  the	  lead	  federal	  agency)	  (1991).	  
35	  See	  10	  U.S.C.	  §124	  (2012)	  –	  DoD	  as	  the	  lead	  federal	  agency;	  46	  U.S.	  Code	  Chapter	  705	  and	  14	  
USC	  §89	  –	  USCG	  as	  the	  lead	  federal	  agency.	  
36	  See	  Controlled	  Substances	  Act,	  21	  U.S.C.	  §801	  (2012).	  The	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Administration	  
(DEA)	  as	  the	  lead	  federal	  agency;	  Title	  19	  of	  U.S.	  Code,	  Customs	  Duties	  –	  CBP	  as	  the	  lead	  
federal	  agency.	  
37	  See	  Use	  of	  Army	  and	  Air	  Force	  as	  Posse	  Comitatus,	  18	  U.S.C.	  §1385	  (2013),	  Military	  Support	  
for	  Civilian	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agencies,	  U.S.C.	  §375	  (2013).	  
38	  See	  Pub.	  L.	  101-­‐510,	  §	  1004,	  Stat.	  1485	  (1990),	  10	  U.S.C.	  Ch.	  18	  (2013).	  	  	  
39	  One	  specific	  example	  of	  this	  is	  support	  of	  certain	  partner	  nation	  air	  bridge	  denial	  programs.	  	  
Through	  multiple	  international	  conventions	  on	  civil	  aviation,	  international	  law	  prohibits	  
destruction	  of	  a	  civil	  aircraft	  in	  service.	  	  This	  is	  codified	  within	  U.S.	  law	  through	  the	  Aircraft	  
Sabotage	  Act	  at	  18	  U.S.C.	  32	  (1984).	  	  However,	  22	  U.S.C.	  §§	  2291(a)(2)	  (2012)	  allows	  the	  U.S.	  
President	  to	  determine	  that	  the	  U.S.	  can	  provide	  aircraft	  interdiction	  assistance	  where	  the	  use	  
of	  force	  may	  be	  an	  option.	  	  Through	  this	  law,	  the	  President	  has	  made	  determination	  that	  air	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technological	   resources,	   U.S.	   military	   personnel	   may	   provide	   training	   and	  
limited	   support.	   	   Because	   TOC	   networks	   are	   diversifying	   not	   only	   in	  
commodities,	  but	  also	  geographically,	  the	  DoD	  offers	  unique	  capabilities	  such	  
as	   subject	   matter	   experts	   on	   culture,	   language	   and	   geography,	   which	   can	  
greatly	  improve	  the	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	  a	  transnational	  law	  enforcement	  
mission.	  	  	  
	   Joint	  Interagency	  Task	  Force	  (JIATF)–South,	  a	  component	  of	  SOUTHCOM,	  
is	  the	  central	  entity	  responsible	  for	  coordination	  and	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  counter-­‐
narcotics	   operations	   through	   the	   Caribbean,	   Central	   and	   South	   America.	  	  
Located	   in	   Key	   West,	   Florida,	   JIATF-­‐South	   is	   an	   interagency	   task	   force	   that	  
serves	   as	   the	   catalyst	   for	   integrated	   and	   synchronized	   interagency	   counter-­‐
drug	  operations	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  detection	  and	  monitoring	  of	  suspect	  
air	   and	  maritime	  drug	   activity	   in	   the	  Caribbean	   Sea,	  Gulf	   of	  Mexico,	   and	   the	  
eastern	  Pacific.	  JIATF-­‐South	  also	  collects,	  processes,	  and	  disseminates	  counter-­‐
drug	   information	   for	   interagency	  operations.40	   	  Comprised	  of	  partners	  across	  
the	   Federal	   agencies	   to	   include	   DoD,	   FBI,	   CBP,	   DEA,	   and	   Immigration	   and	  
Customs	  Enforcement	   (ICE),	   JIATF-­‐S	   is	  currently	  exercising	   its	  primary	  mission	  
through	  Operation	  Martillo	  (which	  translates	  to	  ‘Hammer’	  in	  English).	  	  In	  2011,	  
Operation	   Martillo	   yielded	   seizures	   of	   approximately	   $2.35	   billion	   worth	   of	  
cocaine,	   and	   an	   additional	   $37	   million	   in	   currency	   and	   black	   market	  
contraband.41	   	   Finally,	   and	   arguably	  most	   importantly,	   DoD	   and	   SOUTHCOM	  
combat	   TOC	   through	   building	   the	   capacity	   of	   partner	   nations	   in	   the	   AOR	   to	  
enhance	   their	   security,	   stability,	   and	   anti-­‐trafficking	   efforts.	   	   From	   a	   broad	  
perspective,	   DoD	   and	   SOUTHCOM	   are	   implementers	   of	   several	   U.S.	  
governmental	  programs	  to	  assist	  countries	  in	  the	  AOR.	  	  Within	  the	  last	  decade,	  
the	  United	  States	  has	  dramatically	   increased	   the	  amount	  of	  money	  obligated	  
to	  the	  counter-­‐drug	  fight	  in	  the	  Caribbean,	  Central	  and	  South	  America.	  	  These	  
efforts	   began	   with	   Plan	   Colombia,	   which	   provided	   broad	   counter-­‐narcotics	  
assistance	   authorities	   to	   support	   a	   variety	   of	   activities	   ranging	   from	   crop	  
eradication,	  to	  interdiction,	  to	  institutional	  capacity	  building	  and	  support.	  
	   Also	  specific	  to	  Colombia	  is	  NDAA	  Section	  1021,42	  which	  enables	  the	  U.S.	  
                                                                                                                             
track	  information	  can	  be	  supplied	  to	  Colombia,	  as	  guided	  by	  a	  2007	  bilateral	  agreement	  with	  
strict	  protocol	  and	  limitations,	  to	  enable	  Colombia	  to	  interdict	  illicit	  drug	  traffickers	  and	  use	  
force	  if	  necessary.	  	  
40	  U.S.	  Southern	  Command,	  http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-­‐Team.aspx,	  (last	  
visited	  March	  13,	  2014).	  
41	  U.S.	  Southern	  Command	  Pub.	  Affairs	  Office,	  Multinational	  Operation	  Targets	  Transnational	  
Organized	  Crime,	  USSOUTHCOM,	  Feb.	  8,	  2012,	  available	  at	  
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Multinational-­‐Operation-­‐Targets-­‐Transnational-­‐
Organized-­‐Crime.aspx.	  
42	  See	  Ronald	  W.	  Reagan	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  2005,	  Pub	  .L.	  108-­‐
375,	  §	  1021,	  Stat.	  1812	  (2005).	  Outlines	  the	  use	  of	  Funds	  for	  Unified	  Counterdrug	  and	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26	  
to	  support	  Colombian	  forces	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  narco-­‐terrorist	  groups	  such	  as	  
the	   FARC.	   	   This	   narco-­‐terrorist	   group	   is	   a	   prototype	   of	   an	   organization	   that	  
funds	   its	   ideological	   and	   terrorist	   activities	   through	   the	   sale	   of	   narcotics.	  	  
Statistics	  show	  this	  U.S.	  support	  has	  been	  effective	  in	  reducing	  Colombia’s	  coca	  
cultivation	   from	   about	   74%	   of	   the	   world’s	   supply	   in	   2000,	   down	   to	   43%	   in	  
2009.43	   	   The	   Central	   American	   Regional	   Security	   Initiative	   (CARSI),	  which	   has	  
received	   almost	   $600	  million	   since	   2008,44	   and	   the	   Caribbean	   Basin	   Security	  
Initiative	   (CBSI),	   which	   has	   received	   over	   $250	  million	   since	   2010,45	   are	   two	  
Department	   of	   State	   (DoS)46	   run	   programs	   which	   rely	   on	   significant	   support	  
from	  SOUTHCOM.	  	  These	  programs	  provide	  equipment,	  training,	  and	  technical	  
assistance	   to	  build	   capacity	  of	  our	  Caribbean	  and	  Central	  American	  partners.	  	  
Support	  for	  CARSI	  and	  CBSI	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  police	  professionalization	  and	  
anti-­‐corruption	   training,	   equipment	   and	   training	   to	  maintain	   vessels	   used	   to	  
patrol	  their	  waters,	  and	  technical	  support	  on	  techniques	  to	  intercept	  smuggled	  
contraband.	  	  	  
	   Congress	   also	   provided	   specific	   legal	   authorities	   empowering	   DoD	   to	  
provide	   capacity-­‐building	   support	   to	   partner	   nations.	   	   As	   discussed	   above,	  
NDAA	  section	  1004	  empowers	  DoD	  military	  members	  to	  provide	  counter-­‐drug	  
related	  training.47	   	  Section	  1033	  of	  the	  NDAA	  allows	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  non-­‐
lethal	   equipment	   for	   certain	   pre-­‐approved	   partner	   nations.48	   	   As	   discussed	  
above,	   section	  1021	  of	   the	  NDAA	  allows	   for	  DoD	  assistance	   to	  Colombia	   in	  a	  
unified	   campaign	   against	   narcotics	   trafficking	   and	   terrorist	   organizations.49	  	  
Traditional	  Combatant	  Commander	  activities,	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  
part	   of	   executing	   the	   mission	   of	   a	   geographic	   combatant	   command	   like	  
SOUTHCOM,	  also	  account	  for	  some	  partner	  nation	  engagement	  and	  benefit.	  	  
	   While	   DoD	   implements	   much	   of	   the	   capacity-­‐building	   mission,	   the	  
Foreign	  Assistance	  Act	  of	  1961	  vests	  responsibility	  for	  these	  activities	  with	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State.50	  	  Human	  rights	  vetting	  of	  partner-­‐nation	  government	  units	  
                                                                                                                             
Counterterrorism	  Campaign	  in	  Colombia.	  
43	  UNODC,	  World	  Drug	  Report	  2011,	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  2011,	  at	  99,	  available	  at	  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-­‐and-­‐
analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf.	  
44	  Seelke,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	  	  
45	  Id.	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  22	  U.S.C.	  Ch.	  32	  (2013).	  
47	  Pub.	  L.	  101-­‐510,	  §	  1004,	  Stat.	  1485	  (1990).	  
48	  Pub.	  L.	  105-­‐85,	  §	  1033,	  Stat.	  	  1629	  (1998).	  
49	  Pub.	  L.	  108-­‐375,	  §1021,	  Stat.	  1811	  (2004).	  
50	  See	  Foreign	  Assistance	  Act	  of	  1961,	  Pub.	  L.	  87-­‐195	  as	  amended	  through	  Pub.	  L.	  113-­‐76	  
(2014),	  Pub.	  L.	  112-­‐74,	  §620J	  of	  the	  re-­‐designated	  as	  §620M	  and	  amended.	  This	  aid	  condition	  
originated	  in	  a	  provision	  first	  introduced	  by	  Senator	  Patrick	  Leahy	  as	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  
1997	  Foreign	  Operations	  Appropriations	  Act	  (Pub	  .L.	  104-­‐208)	  restricting	  International	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and	   individuals	   is	   conducted	   prior	   to	   the	   receipt	   of	   any	   type	   of	   training,	  
financial	  assistance,	  or	  capacity	  building.	  	  U.S.	  forces	  will	  not	  cooperate	  with	  or	  
support	   any	   person	   or	   group	   about	   which	   the	   DoS	   has	   received	   ‘credible	  
evidence’	   of	   a	   ‘gross	   violation	   of	   human	   rights.’51	   	   Additionally,	   general	   and	  
country-­‐specific	  performance	  criteria	  must	  be	  met	  before	  a	  nation	  can	  receive	  
counter	   narcotics	   assistance.	   	   Performance	   criteria	  may	   include	  whether	   the	  
partner-­‐nation	   has	   engaged	   in	   or	   tolerated	   particularly	   severe	   violations	   of	  
religious	  freedom;	  or	  whether	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  undertake	  serious	  and	  sustained	  
efforts	  to	  combat	  particularly	  severe	  violations	  of	  religious	  freedom.	  
	   Making	  use	  of	   these	   legal	  authorities,	  SOUTHCOM	  recently	  sent	  a	  team	  
of	  military	  lawyers	  to	  meet	  with	  partner	  nation	  representatives	  and	  discuss	  the	  
legal	  considerations	  associated	  with	  criminalizing,	  interdicting,	  and	  successfully	  
prosecuting	  narco-­‐trafficking	  activities.	  	  The	  resulting	  discussion	  illuminates	  the	  
systemic	   challenges	   SOUTHCOM	  and	  our	  partner	  nations	   face	   as	  we	   look	   for	  
ways	  to	  improve	  our	  counter-­‐drug	  efforts	  within	  each	  nation’s	  justice	  system.	  
	   Partner-­‐nation	   representatives	   expressed	   multiple	   areas	   of	   concern	  
during	  the	  discussions	  including,	  1)	  violence	  against	  participants	  in	  the	  judicial	  
system,	  2)	  corruption	  within	  the	  judicial	  system,	  and	  3)	  the	  above	  concerns,	  as	  
they	   relate	   to	   partner	   nation	   transition	   from	   the	   inquisitorial	   to	   the	  
accusatorial	   justice	  system.	   	  To	  prevent	  violence	  from	  influencing	  the	  system,	  
some	   nations,	   such	   as	   Nicaragua,	   have	   adopted	   various	   protections	   and	  
flexibilities	  within	  their	  domestic	  law,	  which	  allow	  for	  shielding	  the	  identity	  of	  
witnesses,	   judges	  and	  prosecutors	   throughout	   the	  entire	   trial	  process.	   	  Other	  
nations	   are	   still	   exploring	   legal	   options	   and	   were	   interested	   in	   the	   identity	  
concealment	  measures	   allowed	   under	  U.S.	   law	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   sharing	  
model	   legislation.	   	   U.S.	   representatives	   explained	   the	   limited	   identity	  
concealment	   measures	   available	   in	   our	   justice	   system,	   such	   as	   the	   Federal	  
Witness	   protection	   program,	   due	   to	   U.S.	   Constitutional	   requirements	   of	  
accusatorial	   confrontation.	   This	   type	   of	   exchange	   of	   concerns	   and	   ideas	   has	  
built	  mutual	   understanding	   of	   the	   complex	   environment	   SOUTHCOM	   and	   its	  
partner	  nations	  work	  within	   to	   combat	   illicit	   trafficking	  and	  helps	   to	   seal	   the	  





                                                                                                                             
Narcotics	  Control	  assistance	  to	  foreign	  security	  forces	  found	  to	  have	  committed	  gross	  
violations.	  	  Encoded	  in	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Security	  Assistance,	  22	  U.S.C.	  §	  2304	  (2012)	  .	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VI. LOOKING	  AHEAD	  
	   As	  the	  federal	  budget	  begins	  to	  constrict,	  so	  will	  the	  resources	  available	  
for	   this	   fight.	   	   The	   demand	   for	  more	   assets	   to	   combat	   illicit	   trafficking	  must	  
also	   be	   balanced	   against	   the	   demand	   to	   combat	   illegal	   migration,	   counter	  
international	   terrorism,	   provide	   humanitarian	   assistance,	   and	   support	   basic	  
infrastructure	  building	  and	  maintenance.	  	  If	  a	  U.S.	  Coast	  Guard	  cutter	  is	  tasked	  
with	  ensuring	  safety	  of	   life	  at	  sea	  and	   is	   therefore	  required	  to	  patrol	  an	  area	  
known	   to	   be	   a	   historic	   route	   for	   illegal	  migrant	   entry,	   that	   asset	   is	   not	   then	  
available	   to	   patrol	   the	   Northern	   Coast	   of	   Colombia	   searching	   for	   illicit	   drug	  
traffic.	   	  With	   the	  decrease	   in	  available	  ships,	  planes	  and	  manpower,	  comes	  a	  
corresponding	   decrease	   in	   detection	   and	   monitoring	   of	   the	   area	   of	  
responsibility	   and	   subsequent	   interdiction	   of	   illicit	   goods.	   “In	   2013,	   Joint	  
Interagency	  Task	  Force	  South	  was	  unable	  to	  take	  action	  on	  74%	  of	  actionable	  
illicit	   trafficking	   events	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   assets.”52	   	   As	   General	   John	   Kelly,	  
Commander	  of	  U.S.	   Southern	  Command	  explained	  after	   recent	   congressional	  
testimony,	   “It's	   almost	   a	   scientific	   equation:	   more	   assets,	   more	   [illicit	   drug]	  
tonnage."53	  
	   This	   paradigm	  brings	   forth	   two	   increasingly	   important	   concepts	   for	   the	  
DoD	  and	  SOUTHCOM.	  	  First,	  it	  requires	  enhanced	  interagency	  coordination	  and	  
support	   to	   find	   synergies	   and	   efficiencies	  within	   our	   own	   system.	   Second,	   it	  
highlights	   the	   value	   of	   building	   partner	   capacity.	   	   Through	   this	   effort,	   we	  
enable	  our	  partner	  nations	  to	  better	  contribute	  to	  the	  fight	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  
better	   address	   illicit	   trafficking	   at	   its	   source.	   	   While	   those	   of	   us	   working	   in	  
support	   of	   SOUTHCOM	   recognize	   this	   is	   only	   one	   aspect	   of	   a	   whole	   of	  
government	   approach	   against	   the	   scourge	   of	   illicit	   trafficking,	   we	   take	   this	  
responsibility	  very	  seriously.	  	  The	  complex	  problem	  of	  illicit	  trafficking	  demands	  
continued	   commitment,	   and	   SOUTHCOM	  will	   remain	   resolute	   in	   this	   fight	   as	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